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The "Lava Jato" Network: Policy Insights for Confronting Transnational Corruption

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Disclaimer

The facts and the analysis presented herein are sustained in documents and interviews exposed in mass media and judicial records related to the criminal networks analyzed. No primary information uncovering facts has been gathered, which means that only secondary sources were consulted, from legal to media documents. In the case of the names mentioned, quoted or referenced on indictments —with the exception of those specifically mentioned, quoted or referenced in the text as definitively condemned, the presumption of innocence, in observance of individual rights is always preserved.

The judicial truth is the jurisdiction of the courts, which by law will decide whether the defendants are innocent or guilty. It is stated that belonging to, participating in, being connected to, or appearing on a network, as analyzed herein, does not imply having committed a criminal act or being engaged in a criminal enterprise. It is always possible to belong, participate, be connected, or appear on a network as an agent promoting interests that are socially and institutionally beneficial, or as a result of coercion, among other reasons unrelated to criminal acts committed by the agent.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: Confronting Macro-Corruption

In 2008, a judicial operation afterwards known as "Lava Jato" was launched in Brazil, conceived with the aim of investigating criminal structures, specifically related to money laundering. The findings derived from this investigation revealed an international corruption network that operated in more than 12 countries. From its beginning until the present day, over 41 investigation phases have been developed, which have shown a series of criminal subnetworks that operate in different structures within the Brazilian State apparatus.

These illicit networks have proven the inadequacy of the concepts and strategies regarding the fight against corruption developed in the last decade. The Lava Jato case is an example of the extent and operation of illicit networks, which are not always operated by full time criminals, because at least in principle operate inside legal environments. As discussed below, in the present case civil servants took advantage of their position and political power to fully exploit criminal networks and licit businesses, under the guise of legitimacy.

According to official sources discussed in Salcedo-Albarán et al. (2017)[1], the illicit network unveiled during the Lava Jato operation focused on providing services to the parastatal companies PETROBRAS, ELETROBRAS, and government institutions such as the Departments of Health, Public Works, and Transportation of Brazil. These contracts were monopolized by a group of companies known as "The Club", which through illicit electoral financing, bribery, and influence paddling, manipulated the selection process in a way that these firms won the bids and even, in some cases, the same corporations decided the requirements for tendering. As a result, most formal legal requirements were fulfilled, therefore providing appearance of formal legality.

Subsequently, civil servants and businessmen developed a money laundering network through which legitimize the assets obtained from bribes and irregular contracts. In this process, they turned to financial operators to divert money into other legal or illegal unrelated businesses. These professionals also hide illicit assets in accounts held abroad; they even sometimes created façade companies and simulate contracts in order to simultaneously transfer large amounts of money and maintain an appearance of legality. Such actions prevented the authorities from

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[1] Salcedo-Albarán, E., Garay-Salamanca, L.J., Santos, D., Guerra, N., Macías, G. (2017). The "Lava Jato" Network: Corruption and Money Laundering at Petrobras. Vortex Working Paper.

identifying the illegal operations, allowing these groups to obtain more power throughout the years, and enabling certain reconfiguration of governmental institutions.

It has become clear that the concepts adopted in the 90's and the beginning of the 21st century have become obsolete to understand the complexity and scope of the illicit networks currently revealed. Although a network such as the one herein analyzed initially consist on corruption, it was not limited to specific activities such as money laundering or illegal trafficking, their members were not solely full-time criminals but rather public servants and a variety of professionals categorized as grey actors who apparently carried out licit activities but, from an integral perspective, benefited simultaneously from illegal and illegitimate operations, both at the domestic and transnational level. The Lava Jato case demonstrates that concepts such as national sovereignty restrict the field of prosecution and judgment of transnational illicit and criminal networks. As networks can be licit, illicit or grey in different countries, investigations cannot be conducted against an isolated criminal infraction in a single country.

Accordingly, to develop judicial strategies against illicit and criminal networks such as those engaged on corruption and money laundering, it is first necessary to recognize its decentralized character, that is to say, that current networks have a relative high level of resilience given that they do not operate under a pyramidal structure –not just vertically oriented from the top– in which a single leader or boss concentrates the power of decision, but rather they are structured by cells or sub-networks in which members of two sub-networks do not necessarily interact, at least directly. In this context, sometimes it is found that the actions carried out by a member of a sub-network can be considered as legal if analyzed from an individual and isolated approach; however, it could happen that when analyzed in the context of an entire network –through an integral and systemic approach–, this same single action should be treated as illicit or criminal sustaining the application of due penalties. The convenience and necessity of an integral and systemic approach is even more stressed, for instance, when defining the degree of responsibility of each agent member of the network and when identifying the operating scope of the illicit network.

After acknowledging how the characteristics of current decentralized illicit and criminal networks differ from traditional pyramidal criminal organizations, it is critical to adopt new concepts and methodologies for network analysis. Among the most relevant concepts that should be analyzed are: i) hub, which describes the agent within the network that centralizes a large number of direct interactions, ii) structural bridges, which states those agents with highest capacity to

manipulate or control flows of information and other resources within the network, and iii) stabilizers, that makes reference to those agents that maintain the cohesion of sub-networks within the network. Through these concepts, and the classification of types of agents and relationships developed in the network, it is possible to embody, in a descriptive way, a technical analysis for the functioning of a network. Through these concepts, it is possible to identify the real level of significance and impact of each agent and its actions.

Consecutively, a legal framework should be adopted, initially in every country, to adequate, reform and even supplant some prevalent approaches and methodologies for investigation, judgment and sanction. Then, those developments should achieve a transnational level through agreements between Attorney General Offices. As seen in the Lava Jato case, the illegal and criminal networks have become sufficiently sophisticated to develop certain activities in specific countries or continents depending on the institutional framework, for instance, paying bribes in a country, conducting trafficking activities in another and, finally, dissipating assets through a third party in a tax haven (offshore). This transnational operation complicates the prosecutor's or judicial investigator's tasks, given the domestic legal, jurisdictional and institutional restrictions. As a result, in some countries it is not even possible to unveil the ultimate goals of the network and therewith pinpoint the degree of responsibility, participation, and, in some cases, the type of crime that matches the committed actions. For instance, in the particular case of Lava Jato, until today it has not been possible to fully identify the activities of "The Clube" in more than 12 countries were these companies operated. In fact, in most of these countries, there are even signs of reconfiguration of State institutions arising from the actions undertaken by these private companies through the network, by funding political parties, presidential campaigns and massive bribery.

Based on these assessments, the focus of this document is to provide public policy proposals for the implementation of a new strategy for combating and dismantling illicit/criminal networks. This document consists of three parts. Part one is this introduction; the second discusses concepts and methodologies to address the issue of illicit and criminal networks in accordance with the Lava Jato case; and the third and last part provides a synthesis with the specific proposals developed throughout the document.

2. Confronting Macro-networks of Corruption

Prosecutors, attorneys, judicial investigators, judges and journalists usually do not apply innovative concepts and methodologies to understand this emerging illegal complexity, and they also are limited because of the absence of adequate institutional and judicial arrangements to track and explain the functional relations between transnational and local criminal dynamics. Although multilateral entities such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization of American States (OAS) have implemented and adopted protocols to understand and fight corruption within a global context, as it was mentioned, these types of concepts have become obsolete in the context of expanding transnational networks that integrate several illicit, criminal and even apparent legal activities.

The OAS was the first international institution to acknowledge the global character of corruption. In this context, in 1996 during the Caracas' conference, protocols were approved to prevent and fight corruption. Article VI of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, establishes five scenarios in which an act is perceived as corrupt[2]. In addition, in Article VIII it is established a first scenario in which it is recognized the international character of corruption: "it shall be sanctioned the act of offering or granting to a public servant of a different state, direct or indirectly, by part of their nationals, persons with a habitual residence in its territory and companies domiciled there (...)"[3]. This statement reflected a notable progress in terms of understanding and confronting corruption, since describing 3 qualifiers for the active agent recognizes the eventual existence of illicit transnational networks since it suggests that agreements between 3 active agents could happen in different territories. This idea is enhanced by the interpretation of Article XI, sections c) and d), which also recognize an agreement and planning between a diversity of subjects in order to obtain a benefit strictly material[4].

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[2] Article VI establishes as governing principles of an act of corruption the followings: a) solicitation or acceptance, b) offering or granting, c) act or omission, d) fraudulent use or concealment and e) participation.

[3] 3Article VIII "Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party shall prohibit and punish the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their habitual residence in its territory, and businesses domiciled there, to a government official of another State, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage, in connection with any economic or commercial transaction in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that official's public functions"

[4] Article XI "…c) Any act or omission by any person who, personally or through a third party, or acting as an intermediary, seeks to obtain a decision from a public authority whereby he illicitly obtains for himself or for another person any benefit or gain, whether or not such act or omission harms State property; and d) The diversion by a government official, for purposes unrelated to those for which they were intended, for his own benefit or that of a third party, of any movable or immovable property, monies or securities belonging to the State,

While these concepts apprehend some acts revealed by the Lava Jato operation, they fall short by exempting some agents who were critical for the operation of the illicit network. For instance, within the operation "Fratura Exposta", the international companies that allowed Miguel Iskin's companies to establish a fraudulent scheme of international trade of goods and services, specifically of imports, and international bidding. Another example is the case of those banks that play an important role on concealment of illegal funds.

In general, confronting a situation of corruption such as the one observed in the "Lava Jato" network requires an integral and systemic approach. The large amount and diversity of agents and resources flowing across decentralized and transnational structures like the "Lava Jato" network, demands an integral and systemic approach beyond fragmented administrative measures, based on empirical knowledge about factual characteristics and operative framework of these structures. The following are two basic objectives that should be pursued to achieve the required integral approach: (i) Understanding and confronting decentralized and transnational networks of corruption, and (iI) Confronting money laundering related to corruption through real time data analysis and social network analysis of illicit and criminal financial flows.

Objective 1: Understanding and Confronting Decentralized and Transnational Networks of Corruption

Although the Inter-American Convention against Corruption acknowledges an organization and agreement between more than 3 persons, it does not set a comprehensive definition of a complex transnational illegal network in which hundreds or thousands of agents could participate. As a consequence, it inadequately restricts the scope and effects of the entire network, facilitating massive impunity by excluding some agents and acts openly illegal or at least illegitimate, as it omits the actions of grey agents who are supposedly legal but acting to favor illegal interests. For instance, in the Lava Jato case, the sub-operations known as "Calicute" and "Saqueador" provided valuable information concerning the existence of a criminal structure led by Rio de Janeiro's governor, and integrated by his Secretary-General and the representatives of the private companies of "The Club". However, the actions of other agents within the private and public

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to an independent agency, or to an individual, that such official has received by virtue of his position for purposes of administration, custody or for other reasons.

sectors –grey agents– who facilitated the development, allocation and further embodiment of biddings, were not properly considered or punished.

Shortcomings such as those described are the result of limitations imposed by definitions and protocols in force within the Criminal Code. Behaviors carried out by members of an illicit network are often framed as administrative faults when analyzed from an individual approach, and not from an integral and systemic one. In response to this, it is necessary to recognize and understand the differences between a pyramidal, vertical and rigid criminal organizations conformed by a few full-time criminals, and decentralized, horizontal and flexible networks conformed by different types of numerous agents.

Objective 2: Confronting Money Laundering Related to Corruption through Real Time Data Analysis and Social Network Analysis of Illicit Financial Flows

The primary and most basic goal of traditional and simple corruption is to generate economic profits. Therefore, almost by default, money laundering is an illicit activity closely related to corruption networks.

The primary objective of money laundering processes, as often asserted, is to try to convert money derived from an illicit transaction, which is "dirty", into other legitimate assets, thereby concealing the predicate transaction. International law[5] has therefore urged governments to criminalize money conversion processes. Countries are required to penalize the laundering of funds derived from activities that happen within their territory, as well as funds originating abroad. In addition, attention should be paid to proceeds generated by local crime and transmitted to foreign countries. However, several grey areas continue to afflict the criminalization of money laundering around the world. Uncertainty is centered around the lack of uniformity on what predicate transactions are illicit, with the exception of activities recognized by international criminal law, such as drug trafficking. Therefore, the development of common criminal law around money laundering is generally slow, especially when related to corruption. Although instruments such as the OAS Convention Against Corruption and the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime

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[5] International instruments with guidelines to confront money laundering are the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000); Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (1990); the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act (1998); and the UN Convention Against Corruption, 2003.

have been brought into existence to precipitate a convergence of domestic criminal laws against corruption, the level of domestic application is still uneven.

Anti-Money laundering strategies and laws rely heavily on the identification of "suspect" transactions. By definition, compliance legislation can only work where there is solid evidence for suspicion. The existence of such evidence is based on background information and profiling for certain activities. A starting point for identifying money laundering activities consists on locating the predicate activity areas from which proceeds from laundering are derived. Potentially, there are as many activities relevant to inquiry as there are varieties of economic crimes. For that reason, it is necessary to prioritize activities based on the perceptions of law enforcement authorities. For example, the American origin of the term "money laundering" is intricately connected to organized crime in the activities of alcohol trafficking and prostitution. When it was introduced into international criminal law, the money laundering control was directed to drug trafficking[6]. In many ways, syndicated drug trafficking is still regarded as a core predicate activity for money laundering. However, since early 80s the drug trafficking industry has been known to influence trends in "downstream" crimes, notably vehicle theft, smuggling, corruption, housebreaking, armed robbery and murder. As it is an industry that involves several participants, it is necessary to identify the important role players for the purpose of money laundering.

In this sense, protocols must be established to identify suspicious transactions derived from legal activities but potentially useful for money laundering. For this, an up-to-date regional criminal networks database shall exist; centralized data describing domestic and transnational illicit structures is critical for confronting corruption and money laundering. International experience has proven that effective disruption of crime networks can only be achieved when strategies are preceded and informed by intelligence, and corruption is not an exception. Since analysis transform raw data into intelligence, it is necessary to adopt processes, protocols, methodologies and technological tools to be executed on a permanent basis. Without the ability to perform an effective and real-time analysis, the intelligence process is reduced just to a simple storage and retrieval system of unrelated data. The increasing volume of global transmitted data that includes illicit financial flows imposes the need of permanent and real-time analysis. Protocols related to Social

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[6] Goredema, C. (2004). Money laundering in Southern Africa. Incidence, magnitude and prospects for its control. Institute for Security Studies Papers, 2004(92), p. 11.

Network Analysis (SNA) are currently critical for visualizing and understanding not only networks of corruption but illicit financial flows between individuals and groups.

Processes and protocols related to SNA allow analysts to identify those relevant agents that intervene within the networks such as (i) "hubs" or agents centralizing direct interactions, (ii) structural bridges, or agents with high capacity to arbitrate or intervene in the flows of resources within the network, including financial flows and information, and (iii) agents who are the stabilizers of the network. Likewise, SNA supports organization and systematization of information by categories, which facilitates the understanding of: (i) the types of nodes/agents involved, (ii) the types of interactions, (iii) those leading agents that concentrate the direct interactions of the structure, (iv) those agents that concentrate the capacity to arbitrate resources within the structure, (v) main flows of resources, (vi) amounts and types of resources, and (vii) sub-structures specialized on certain tasks and roles. These findings allow authorities to concentrate their efforts on those agents who play a crucial role in the network and stabilize the corrupt structure. As well, this technological tools, methodologies and protocols allow authorities to collaborate with information to disrupt criminal markets and transnational organizations.

3. Policy Insights

In order to achieve the basic objectives described above, the following short-term guidelines are proposed:

Guideline 1. Promoting theoretical and conceptual approaches –including protocols, methodologies, and operative tools– useful for understanding and confronting massive, transnational and decentralized structures of corruption.

It is important to distinguish between different corrupt practices, as well as forms of money laundering that occur at a state, corporate, political parties and electoral levels; furthermore, it is critical that researchers, investigators and judicial operators are able of acknowledging and confronting sophisticated and complex forms of corruption that are sometimes omitted in criminal codes and legislation.

+ **Action 1:** Execute research projects to understand the operative and structural characteristics of macro-networks of corruption.

+ **Action 2:** Replicate comparative research projects that deepen on the patterns of local, national, and regional corruption.

+ **Action 3:** Organize training and technical strengthening processes for entities in charge of investigating and judging corrupt practices.

+ **Action 4:** Promote criminal code reforms to facilitate investigating and judging macro-criminal corruption.

Guideline 2. Strengthening controls on electoral funding.

Political parties and political activity in general, are currently used as a platform for installing private and even illicit resources and interests at the core of the public administration, across branches and administrative levels. As a result, critical institutions at the highest levels of every branch are constantly manipulated and compromised by private or illicit structures, which distort the most basic principles of the Rule of Law. This phenomenon is extremely harmful in political and social contexts characterized by intense criminal activity such as those observed in Latin America. Therefore, it is critical to:

+ **Action 1:** Establish domestic task forces to improve judicial investigation against illicit funding.

+ **Action 2:** Adopt protocols and technological tools by prosecutors and judges, to understand functional relations between political, private and criminal structures.

+ **Action 3:** Increase criminal and administrative sanctions against illicit electoral funding by enforcing strict and comprehensive regulation codes on donations and sponsorships.

Guideline 3. Strengthening criminal and administrative controls on public contracts.

As revealed in the "Lava Jato" illicit network, some kinds of illicit interactions between public and private sectors concretize through public contracts. Illicit electoral funding facilitates the perverse influence of private and criminal interests into public administration, public biddings and contracts in

order to guarantee appropriate returns to those private agents involved, accumulating their political power and profits.

> + Action 1: Implement contractual models to promote free competition for bidding companies.

> + Action 2: Implement real-time monitoring of information related to public contracts through work teams entrusted to conduct (i) preventive monitoring of calls for tenders, (ii) background checking of companies' representatives, (iii) comparative analysis of prices.

> + Action 3: Monitor and assess changes in public contracts, demanding a correct and appropriate verification of incremental costs and reporting modifications to the corresponding Attorney General Office.

> + Action 4: Provide wider access to information and control over public expenditures and State contracting through the implementation of channels of citizen accountability to oversight local and national institutions.

Additionally, the following mid-term guidelines are proposed to complement the previous list:

Guideline 4: Preventing macro-networks of corruption.

Over recent years, early warning systems have been implemented in some European countries with the goal to prevent corruption activities and identify illicit networks. Applying these systems has allowed some reduction in areas of operation of these networks, as well as opportunities of engaging in acts of corruption.

> + Action 1: Activate support lines and work teams to follow up citizen reports.

> + Action 2: Implement an early warning system for corruption, which activates preventive research protocols through regular measuring systems for malpractices at a corporate, state, and electoral level.

Guideline 5: Implementing sub-systems within the judiciary focused on judging cases of macro-criminal networks engaged on corruption.

During and after the Alberto Fujimori's regime in Peru, the actions exercised by the anti-corruption sub-system adopted in 2000 were critical for investigating and punishing the acts of corruption and

other illicit activities. This subsystem established effective conditions to conduct appropriate legal actions against Vladimiro Montesinos for the crimes of corruption, money laundering and illicit enrichment, and finally against Alberto Fujimori. As the case of "Lava Jato" has made clear, the cases of macro-crime and corruption are particularly complex especially when they are developed under "apparent" legal conditions.

+ **Action 1**: Create a new regulatory system that considers those legal circumstances or conditions that could favor cases of grand corruption and macro-criminal networks. This means, cases with many defendants involved, activities and charges, territories and periods of times.

+ **Action 2**: Adapt economic, administrative and criminal sanctions to the real impacts and last consequences of corruption to make them congruent with the level of responsibility of each illicit act and degree of importance of each agent.

+ **Action 3**: Provide training to judges, officials and secretaries involved in the anti-corruption sub-system in charge of the investigation of grand corruption and illicit networks: specially, receiving training on how to classify and analyze large volumes of data.

Annex 1

The following sources were analyzed by Salcedo-Albaran et al. (2017)[,] through Social Network Analysis as empirical evidence for this document.

1. First court decisions: Lava Jato, Dolce Vita, Bidone and Casablanca

1.1.   17/2/2014 - Operação Lava Jato. PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5001438¬85.2014.404.7000/PR
1.2.   17/2/2014 - Operação Dolce Vita. PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5001461¬31.2014.404.7000/PR
1.3 .   24/2/2014 - Operação Bidone PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5001438¬85.2014.404.7000/PR
1.4 .   25/2/2014 - Operação Casa Blanca PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5001443¬10.2014.404.7000/PR

2. Court decisions

First Stage

2.1.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5025687-03.2014.404.7000/PR
2.2.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5025692-25.2014.4.04.7000/PR
2.3.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5026212-82.2014.4.04.7000/PR
2.4.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5026243-05.2014.404.7000/PR
2.5.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5035707-53.2014.404.7000/PR
2.6.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5047229-77.2014.4.04.7000/PR

Second Stage

2.7.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5083376-05.2014.4.04.7000/PR
2.8.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5083360-51.2014.4.04.7000/PR
2.9.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5083351-89.2014.4.04.7000/PR
2.10.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5083401-18.2014.4.04.7000/PR
2.11.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5083258-29.2014.4.04.7000/PR
2.12.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5027422-37.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.13.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5083838-59.2014.4.04.7000/PR
2.14.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5007326-98.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.15.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5012331-04.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.16.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5023121-47.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.17.   PROCESSO Nº 5023162-14.2015.4.04.7000
2.18.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5023135-31.2015.4.04.7000/PR

[,] Salcedo-Albarán, E., Garay-Salamanca, L.J., Santos, D., Guerra, N., Macías, G. (2017). The "Lava Jato" Network: Corruption and Money Laundering at Petrobras. Vortex Working Paper.

2.19.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5036528-23.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.20.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5039475-50.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.21.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5045241-84.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.22.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5061578-51.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.23.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5029737¬38.2015.4.04.7000/PR
2.24.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5013405-59.2016.4.04.7000/PR
2.25.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5022179-78.2016.4.04.7000/PR
2.26.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5030424-78.2016.4.04.7000/PR
2.27.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5051606¬23.2016.4.04.7000/PR
2.28.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5030883¬80.2016.4.04.7000/PR
2.29.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5022182¬33.2016.4.04.7000/PR

3. Court decisions and annexes of judicial processes.

3.1.   Autos N° 2009.70.00.019131-5 AÇÃO PENAL
3.2.   PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5073475 13.2014.4.04.7000/PR
3.3.   AUTOS DE AÇÃO PENAL nº 5025699-17.2014.404.7000
3.4.   Contrarrazões, JOÃO LUIZ CORREIA ARGÔLO DOS SANTOS, SIDNEY ROCHA PEIXOTO – OAB/AL 6217
3.5.   PEDIDO DE PRISÃO PREVENTIVA Nº 5011708-37.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.6.   TERMO DE COLABORAÇÃO Nº 1 que presta JULIO GERIN DE ALMEIDA CAMARGO
3.7.   EXTRATO DETALHADO - CASO 001-MPF-001360-10
3.8.   AUTOS Nº: 5023162-14.2015.4.04.7000
3.9.   PEDIDO DE QUEBRA DE SIGILO DE DADOS E/OU TELEFÔNIC Nº 5031505-33.2014.404.7000/PR
3.10.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5013405-59.2016.4.04.7000/PR
3.11.   AUTOS Nº: 5025692-25.2014.404.7000
3.12.   AUTOS nº 5083401-18.2014.404.7000
3.13.   APELAÇÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5026212-82.2014.4.04.7000/PR
3.14.   Ofício n.º 8243851 AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5025699-17.2014.404.7000/PR
3.15.   ANEXO 5 – LEGEND
3.16.   Processo Administrativo nº 13896.721116/2015-85. TERMO DE VERIFICAÇÃO FISCAL
3.17.   Autos originários nº 5073475-13.2014.404.7000 IPL nº 5071698-90.2014.404.7000 (CAMARGO CORREA) IPL nº 5053836-09.2014.404.7000 (UTC)
3.18.   Ofício n.º 8244356 AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5025699-17.2014.404.7000/PR
3.19.   Autos nº: 5023121-47.2015.404.7000
3.20.   Devolução de carta precatória devidamente cumprida. 40120162095521, 8664-37.2016_31-8.pdf 15/08/2016 14:43:06
3.21.   AUTOS nº: 5083351-89.2014.4.04.7000
3.22.   Autos nº 5053845-68.2014.404.7000 e 5044866-20.2014.404.7000 (IPL referente à ENGEVIX), 5049557-14.2013.404.7000 (IPL originário), 5073475-13.2014.404.7000 (Buscas e Apreensões) e conexos
3.23.   Distribuição por dependência aos autos nº 5049557-14.2013.404.7000 (IPL originário), 5004996-31.2015.404.7000 (IPL referente a Mario Goes), 5085114-28.2014.404.7000 (Busca e Apreensão RIOMARINE) e conexos.
3.24.   RELATÓRIO DE ANÁLISE DE POLÍCIA JUDICIÁRIA nº 124/2016
3.25.   Autos nº 50001965720154047000

3.26.   INFORMAÇÃO Nº 036/2015-DELEFIN/DRCOR/SR/DPF/PR
3.27.   Processo nº 5027422-37.2015.4.04.7000
3.28.   Processo-crime de autos nº 5037800-18.2016.404.7000
3.29.   TERMO DE DEPOIMENTO DE MARCOS PEREIRA BERTI
3.30.   Denúncia no Inquérito nº 2245
3.31.   Ofício n.º 8284027 AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5026243-05.2014.404.7000/PR
3.32.   QUESTÃO DE ORDEM NA AÇÃO PENAL 871 PARANÁ
3.33.   Autos de AÇÃO PENAL nº 5047229-77.2014.404.7000
3.34.   PEDIDO DE PRISÃO PREVENTIVA Nº 5012323-27.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.35.   TERMO DE AUDIÊNCIA Ação Penal nº5037800-18.2016.404.7000
3.36.   OFÍCIO Nº 700000522775 AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5012331-04.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.37.   Contrarrazões ao recurso de apelação MATEUS COUTINHO DE SÁ OLIVEIRA e JOSÉ RICARDO NOGUEIRA BREGHIROLLI
3.38.   PEDIDO DE PRISÃO PREVENTIVA Nº 5004872-14.2016.4.04.7000/PR
3.39.   TEXTO COM REDAÇÃO FINAL. CONSELHO DE ÉTICA E DECORO PARLAMENTAR. REUNIÃO Nº: 979/2014 DATA: 13/8/2014
3.40.   TERMO DE DECLARAÇÕES que presta MEIRE BONFIM DA SILVA POZA
3.41.   AUTO DE QUALIFICAÇÃO INTERROGATÓRIO De: LUIZ CLÁUDIO MACHADO RIBEIRO
3.42.   REFERÊNCIA: AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5026663-10.2014.404.7000, CARLOS HABIB CHATER ABDOGADO
3.43.   PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5004257-58.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.44.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5061578-51.2015.4.04.7000/PR. OFÍCIO Nº 700001435567.
3.45.   PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5014497-09.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.46.   PEDIDO DE QUEBRA DE SIGILO DE DADOS E/OU TELEFÔNIC Nº 5026387-13.2013.404.7000/PR
3.47.   PEDIDO DE QUEBRA DE SIGILO DE DADOS E/OU TELEFÔNIC Nº 5073645-82.2014.404.7000/PR
3.48.   Autos nº 5003682-16.2016.404.7000
3.49.   EXCEÇÃO DE INCOMPETÊNCIA CRIMINAL Nº 5022869-44.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.50.   APELAÇÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5023162-14.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.51.   21/06/2016 SEGUNDA TURMA INQUÉRITO 3.997 DISTRITO FEDERAL
3.52.   REGISTROS 0088693 NESTOR CUNAT CERVERO
3.53.   SOLICITAÇÃO DE ASSISTÊNCIA JURÍDICA EM MATÉRIA PENAL - SAJ Nº 700000454378
3.54.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5083351-89.2014.4.04.7000/PR OFÍCIO Nº 700000424021
3.55.   Para distribuição por dependência aos autos nº 5046019-54.2015.4.04.7000 (Representação Criminal), nº 5047925-79.2015.404.7000 (Inquérito Policial) e nº 5049557-14.2013.404.7000 (Inquérito Bidone).
3.56.   IPL 0014808-07.2013.403.6120
3.57.   Ação Penal nº 5045241-84.2015.4.04.7000
3.85.   Autos nº 50001965720154047000
3.59.   PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5012298-77.2016.4.04.7000/PR
3.60.   SERVIÇO PUBLICO FEDERAL MJ - POLÍCIA FEDERAL - SEDE TERMO DE DECLARAÇÕES DE PAULO CÉSAR ROXO RAMOS
3.61.   RESPOSTA À ACUSAÇÃO AÇÃO PENAL nº 5013405-59.2016.4.04.7000
3.62.   AÇÃO PENAL 470 MINAS GERAIS
3.63.   RELATÓRIO DE POLÍCIA JUDICIÁRIA Nº 010/16 ANÁLISE DE MÍDIA APREENDIDA
3.64.   Referência: ofício no 4001 -201s DpF - lpl 131 stzo14-4 sR/DpF/pR

3.65.   Autos nº 5012331-04.2015.404.7000
3.66.   PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5073475-13.2014.404.7000/PR
3.67.   Os pedidos de prisão e condução coercitiva Folhapress
3.68.   PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5014455-57.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.69.   Translation Leonardo Meirelles e-mail
3.70.   Comptes bancaires utilisés dans la dernière couche des opérations de blanchiment.
Ministère Public Fédéral.
3.71.   AÇÃO PENAL Nº 5049898-06.2014.404.7000/PR
3.72.   PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5085114-28.2014.404.7000/PR
3.73.   Autos nº 5053744-31.2014.404.7000 (IPL referente à Mendes Júnior), 5073475-
13.2014.404.7000 (buscas e apreensões), 5049557-14.2013.404.7000 (autos originais) e
conexos.
3.74.   PEDIDO DE QUEBRA DE SIGILO DE DADOS E/OU TELEFÔNIC Nº 5009225-
34.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.75.   Documento Interno do Sistema Petrobras – DIP
3.76.   TERMO DE DEPOIMENTO DE MARCOS PEREIRA BERTI
3.77.   PEDIDO DE QUEBRA DE SIGILO DE DADOS E/OU TELEFÔNIC Nº 5029786-
79.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.78.   Habeas Corpus n.º 5029560-25.2015.404.0000
3.79.   INFORMAÇÃO Nº 96/2014 QUALIFICAÇÃO – CONTATOS YOUSSEF – UTC/CONSTRAN
Data: 15/10/2014
3.80.   Autos nº: 5014455-57.2015.404.7000
3.81.   Autos nº 5039475-50.2015.4.04.7000
3.82.   EXCEÇÃO DE LITISPENDÊNCIA Nº 5052022-59.2014.404.7000/PR
3.83.   TERMO DE TRANSCRIÇÃO Audiência do dia 19/02/2004
3.84.   Autos nº 5036518-76.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.85.   PEDIDO DE BUSCA E APREENSÃO CRIMINAL Nº 5055178- 21.2015.4.04.7000/PR
3.86.   Exmo. Sr. Dr. SÉRGIO FERNANDO MORO
3.87.   ANEXO 05) Termo de transcrição dos interrogatórios dos coacusados na Ação Penal no
502569917.2014.404.7000

4. Substructures

4.1.   DISTRIBUÇAO POR DEPENDÊNCIA AOS AUTOS N° 0506973-80.2016.4.02.5101 –
QUEBRA DE SIGILOS BANCÁRIO E FISCAL
4.2.   N° 108397/2017 – GTLJ-PGR INQUÉRITO N° 3995/DF
4.3.   Processo a ser distribuido por dependencia aos autos n° 0501018-34.2017.4.02.5101
4.4.   DISTRIBUÇAO POR DEPENDÊNCIA:
Autos n°053012-97-2017.4.02.5101 – homologacao de colaboracao premiada
Autos n°0503104-75.2017.4.02.5101 – prisao preventiva
Autos n°0502479-41.2017.4.02.5101 – quebra telemática
Autos n°0502500-17.2017.4.02.5101 – quebra de sigilos bancário/fiscal
Autos n°0503213-89.2017.4.02.5101 – quebra datos telefónicos
Autos n°0503229-43.2017.4.02.5101 – interceptacao
Autos n°0503211-22.2017.4.02.5101 – medida cautelar de sequestro
Autos n°0503212-07.2017.4.02.5101 – busca e apreensao
Autos n°0503371-47.2017.4.02.5101 – busca e apreensao complementar

Autos n° 0503435-57.2017.4.02.5101 – inquerito policial (IPL 37/2017)

4.5.   Processo a ser distribuído por dependencia aos autos n°0503012-97.2017.4.02.5101

4.6.   Processo n° 0503104-75.2017.4.02.5101

4.7.   Processo n° 0502834-85.2016.4.02.5101

4.8.   Distribucao por dependencia: Processo n° 0210926-86.2015.4.02.5101

4.9.   Processo de autos n°0504048-77.2017.4.02.5101

4.10.   Processo a ser distribuido por dependencia aos autos n° 0503012-97.2017.4.02.2101

4.11.   Processo de autos n° 0504048-77.2017.4.02.5101

4.12.   Processo a ser distribuido por dependencia aos autos n° 0503012-97.2017.02.5110

4.13.   Distribucao por dependencia aos autos n° 5006617-29.2016.4.04.7000/PR Ref. Inquérito Policial n°5006597-38.2016.4.04.7000

4.14.   ACAO PENAL N° 5046512-94.2016.4.04.7000/PR

4.15.   PROCESSO N° 12393-69.2017.4.01.3500

4.16.   PROCESSO N°12393-69.2017.4.01.3500

4.17.   CASO "DE VOLTA AOS TRILHOS" IPL n° 0533/2013-4 SR/DPF/GO

4.18.   IPL 0017513-21.2014.4.02.5101 DISTRIBUZAO POR DEPENDENCIA: AUTOS N°0057817-33.2012.4.02.5101 (OPERACAO SAQUEADOR) E 0509503-57.2016.4.02.5101 (OPERACIÓN CALICUTE)

4.18.   PROCESSO N° 0017513.21.2014.4.02.5101 (2014.51.01.017513-9)

Documents were extracted from https://jota.info/lavajota/ and http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/ .